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NASD Regulation of IPO Conflicts of Interest-
Does Gatekeeping Work?
Royce de R. Barondes"
Numerous scholarly analyses of capital markets regulation conceptualize assorted
professionals, e.g., lawyers, accountants, and investment banks, as '"atekeepers." Although
some gatekeeping is explicit, e.g., the auditrequirement forpublic companies, other gatekeeping
is implicit. Lawyers and investment banks act as gatekeepers in deciding whether to link their
professional reputations to prospective clients.
Much legal scholarsh'p investigating gatekeeping is qualitative, presenting merely
indeteminate analyses. ThisArticle informs the debate bypresenting empirical evidence of the
efficacy of one kind ofgatekeeper a "qualified independent underwriter"
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) rules provide that when an
investment bank participating in a securities offering has one of several enumerated conflicts of
interest, the securities cannot be sold at a price higher than that recommended by a qualified
independent underwriter Examining prices of 1188 imtiai public offerings (IPOs) from 1997
through 2000, regression results 'sclose IPO purchasers have relatively worse initial returns,
estimated at fleen percentage points lower, where participating investment banks are receiving
more than 10% of the IPO proceeds. There also is a relatively worse itial return, estimated at
twenty-seven percentage points lower, whereparticipating investment banks own at least 10% of
the issuers preferred stock or subordinated debt Qualitatively similar results are obtained by
estimating the "averge effect of the treatment on the treated" through propensity score
matching.
The results indicate proposals to subject all JPO pricing to approval by independent
broker-dealers-on which the NASD solicited comments-would likely be ineffectual The
results also provide guidance in assessing the extent to which reputational capital provides
adequate incentives for investment banks to act as gatekeepers.
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 860
II. THE IPO PROCESS ........................................................................ 866
A. Underpricing ...................................................................... 867
B. Inherent Collusion, LimitedAntirustApplication,
and Multiple Clients ........................................................... 868
C The NASD QualifiedIndependent Underwriter
R ules ................................................................................... 87 1
D Setting the IPO Price .......................................................... 872
III. EXISTING THEORETICAL MODELS OF THE IPO PROCESS ............ 875
* Senior Fellow, Contracting and Organizations Research Institute; Associate
Professor, University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law. The author would like to thank
John Howe; Cynthia McDonald; Gary Sanger; Mike Sykuta; and, for comments on
preliminary results, participants at the 2002 Annual Huber Hurst Research Seminar.
Generous financial support was provided by the L.G. "Greg" Copeland Faculty Research
Fellowship, the Glenn A. McCleary Memorial Faculty Research Fellowship, and the Donald
P. Thomasson Faculty Research Fellowship.
859
HeinOnline  -- 79 Tul. L. Rev. 859 2004-2005
860 TULANELA WREVIEW [Vol. 79:859
A. IP0 Underpricing Generally ............................................. 876
B. Universal Banks ............................... 880
C Existing Literature Incomplete in Examining
Conflicts of Interest and QIUs ........................................... 881
IV D ATA ............................................................................................. 882
V EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS ............................................. 885
A. Inial Model of lnitial Return ............................................ 885
B Propensity Score Matching and Estimation of
Likelihood ofa Conflict ..................................................... 892
C Pre-IPO andPost-IPO Quaties and Centles .................. 895
D Interpretation ofResults .................................................... 897
V I. POSSIBLE REFORM ....................................................................... 898
V II. C ONCLUSION ................................................................................ 900
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate scandals' have yielded a substantial amount of
scholarly literature on regulatory mechanisms to restrain opportunism
in the capital markets.2 The current regulatory framework in large
measure relies on mandatory disclosure.3 An additional component of
the framework that is perceived to reduce malfeasance is the
participation of gatekeepers: professionals whose roles include
restricting access to the capital markets by certain issuers.
Some of this gatekeeping is expressly mandated by federal law.
Examples include certain requirements to provide audited financial
statements in annual reports4 and registration statements Other
1. Recent corporate scandals are so numerous, the Wall Sreet Journal has prepared
a scorecard. Robert Frank et al., Scandal Scorecard: Executives on Trial, WALL ST. J., Oct. 3,
2003, at B 1.
2. See, e.g., Mitu Gulati et al., Fraud by Hindsigh4 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 773, 775 n.8
(2004); Symposium, Crisis in Confidence: Corporate Governance and Professional Ethics
Post-Enron Sponsored by Wiggin & Dana, 35 CONN. L. REv. 915 (2003); Symposium, Enron
and Its Alternath, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 671 (2002); Symposium, Enron and the Future of
US. Corporate Law and Policy, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269 (2004); Symposium, Enron:
Lessons and Implications, 8 STANFORD J. L. Bus. & FIN. 1 (2002); E Hodge O'Neal
Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: Alter the Sarbanes-OxleyAct" The Future of the
Mandatory Disclosure System, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229 (2003); Lessons from Enron: A
Symposium on Corporate Governance, 54 MERCER L. REv. 663 (2003); Lessons from Enron,
How Did Corporate and Securities Law Fail 48 VtLL. L. REv. 989 (2003); Symposium, On
Enron, Worldcom, and TheirAftermath, 27 VT. L. REv 817 (2003).
3. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e, 77g, 77j (2000) (requiring the filing of a prospectus
and registration statement for newly issued securities).
4. Eg., Form 10-K, Item 8, 5 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 31,104, at 22,067 (Oct. 20,
2004) (requiring provision of financial statements meeting the requirements of Regulation S-
X, 17 C.FR. pt. 210 (2004)).
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gatekeeping is not express but implicit. For example, Gilson and
Kraakman, in their famous work, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, indicate investment banks implicitly "rent" their
reputations when they underwrite securities, which thereby implicitly
makes underwriters gatekeepers.7
These gatekeepers have conflicts of interest. Issuers select their
auditors. An auditor may be concerned that aggressive gatekeeping
will result in its losing business.8 An investment bank that is too
aggressive in requiring adverse disclosure about an issuer may lose
future underwriting business.
5. Eg, Form S-1, Item 11 (e), 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 7121, at 6237 (Oct. 22,
2001) (requiring provision of financial statements meeting the requirements of Regulation S-
X, 17 C.ER. pt. 210).
6. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market
Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 620 (1984). See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Foreword"
Revisiting Gilson and Kraakman' Efficiency Story, 28 J. CORP. L. 499, 499 (2003) ("Gilson
and Kraakman's Mechanisms of Market Efficiency is part of the canon of modem corporate
law scholarship, one of a handful of articles that has profoundly influenced the way we think
about the field." (footnote omitted)).
7. The scholarship conceptualizing participants who affect the capital markets as
gatekeepers is voluminous. E.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., What CausedEnron? A Capsule Social
and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 269, 279 (2004) (using the term
"gatekeeper" to refer to "intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to
investors"); Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal
Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888-97 (1984) (discussing "gatekeeper liability and enforcement
insufficiency"); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of
Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REv. 1189, 1189, 1198-1208 (2003) (explaining how
gatekeepers are affected by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745); Richard W Painter, Convergence and Competition in Rules Governing Lawyers and
Auditors, 29 J. CORP. L. 397, 399, 415-22 (2004) (discussing the provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act); Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers: A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84
B.U. L. REv. 365, 366, 368-75 (2004) (arguing for a strict liability regime for gatekeepers, but
"enabl[ing] experts to specify the range of liability as a percentage of the issuer's liability,
subject to a specified minimum percentage"); David A. Westbrook, Corporation Law Alter
Enron: The Possibility ofa Capitalist Reimagination, 92 GEo. L.J. 61, 89 (2003) (noting that
both "internal and external 'gatekeeping' efforts have intensified" in response to the
challenge posed by the Enron scandal). Some scholars' conceptualizations using the
gatekeeping framework are reflected in the choices of titles. E.g., Stephen Choi, Market
Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 916 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper
Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REv. 301
(2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as
Gatekeeper. An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. RE. 1293 (2003).
8. Reflecting this concern, in 2000, the SEC increased disclosure requirements and
limited auditors' provision of nonaudit services. Revision of the Commission's Auditor
Independence Requirements, Securities Act Release No. 7919, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,008 (Dec. 5,
2000) (codified in part at 17 C.ER. § 210.2-01 (2004)). In addition, section 201 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 added paragraph (g) of section 1 OA of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(g) (Supp. II 2002), which limits the provision of nonaudit
services by independent auditors.
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Much of the legal scholarship investigating gatekeeping presents
plausible qualitative analyses.9 However, in assessing alternative
proposals to enhance gatekeeping by changing incentives," it is useful
to have additional empirical information on the extent to which
gatekeepers are effective. This Article seeks to inform the debate
concerning gatekeeping by presenting empirical evidence of the
efficacy of a particular kind of gatekeeper, a "qualified independent
underwriter" (QU).
Investment banks acting as underwriters are not required to be
independent." They may, and occasionally do, have financial interests
in an issuer or a securities offering in addition to receipt of
underwriting fees.'2 For example, a company may sell securities to the
public for purposes of raising funds to be used to repay an underwriter
participating in the offering (or its associates or affiliates).
Alternatively, an underwriter (or its associates or affiliates) may have a
preexisting equity stake in the issuer.
The federal regulation of securities offerings typically does not
regulate the merits of a securities offering.'3 Rather, it merely
mandates disclosure of certain material information.' The federal
regulatory framework governing offerings presenting conflicts of
interest is atypical, however; it seeks to assure directly that securities
sold in these public offerings are properly priced.
The pertinent rules are promulgated by the NASD. The NASD is
a form of self-regulatory organization-a national securities
association that regulates and supervises the conduct of its member
9. See generally Gregory Mitchell, Case Stu&es, Counterfactuals, and Causal
Explanations, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1517, 1521-23 (2004) (expressing concern with use of a
single case study to support analyses of policy prescriptions).
10. Compare Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 7, at 345-63 (proposing a
modified form of strict liability for auditors with limits on their exposure, as well as imposing
certain gatekeeper responsibilities on attorneys, including a "negative assurance" certification
obligation), and John C. Coffee, Jr., Partnoy' Complaint: A Response, 84 B.U. L. REv. 377,
378, 382 (2004) (replying to Professor Partnoy's proposal), with Partnoy, supra note 7, at 368-
74 (arguing for a modified strict liability regime, but limiting liability through contract as
opposed to regulatory caps).
11. See generally NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, MANUAL (CCH) Rule 2720 (Dec.
2003) (recognizing the existence of conflicts of interest involving underwriting banks and
prescribing rules for dealing with them).
12. See id. (recognizing that underwriters are not independent).
13. See generally I Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 169-77
(3d ed. 1998) (describing the choice of a philosophy of disclosure). State securities laws may
regulate the merits of a securities offering. See generallyid at 112-25 (discussing the merit-
regulation component of state securities laws and the partial preemption of state merit
regulation).
14. Id at 151-55.
[Vol. 79:859
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brokers and dealers.'5 Rules proposed by the NASD regulating its
members are subject to SEC approval and abrogation."
NASD rules require that certain offerings involving these
conflicts of interest be sold at prices no higher than prices
recommended by QTUs.'7 During the recent four-year period studied
in this Article, those conflicts included, inter alia, (1) more than 10% of
the net offering proceeds, excluding underwriting compensation, was
to be paid to members participating in the distribution or their
associates or affiliates, subject to certain exceptions; (2) a member
participating in the distribution (or certain persons related to that
member) sold securities in the offering or in the following 90 days,
unless those securities were not more than 1% of the securities being
offered; and (3) 10% or more of the issuer's common stock or
preferred stock or subordinated debt was owned by a member
participating in the distribution or its associates or affiliates. 8
To examine the efficacy of QIUs, this Article reviews IPO-
pricing statistics. If pricing statistics for IPOs involving QIUs are
different from those of other IPOs, or they vary depending on the
circumstance that gives rise to the need for a QIU, that indicates the
regulatory scheme fails, because the scheme is designed to make
securities prices invariant to the conflicts of interest that give rise to the
need for a Q1U.
The primary empirical analysis in this Article examines the
difference between the price at which stock is sold in an IPO and the
closing price on the day of the offering, a difference called the hnt!ial
return or underpicig. If QIUs are effective, the initial return should
not be related to the fact that there is a QIU.
Using an ordinary least squares regression to examine a sample
of 1188 IPOs from 1997 through 2000 (all common stock, "firm
commitment" IPOs of nonfinancial firms for which the commercial
databases used reported the required data), this Article finds there is a
different relationship between the initial return and the presence of a
QIU, depending on the reason a QIU is required: a negatve
relationship where at least 10% of the issuer's subordinated debt or
preferred stock is owned by a participating NASD member (or its
associates or affiliates) (-27%; p-value of 0.003); a negatve
relationship where more than 10% of the proceeds is being received by
15. 6 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2795-2824 (3d ed. rev. 2002).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)-(c) (2000).
17. NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 11, Rule 2720(c)(3).
18. See infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
2005] 863
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participating NASD members (or their associates or affiliates) (-15%;
p-value of 0.0 19); and a posive relationship for ownership of at least
10% of the issuer's common stock (15%; p-value of 0.210).'" These
relationships are economically significant as well. There also is a
statistically significant difference between each of the first two
coefficients and the third coefficient (p-values of 0.003 and 0.020,
respectively).
In addition, this Article finds a statistically significant greater
likelihood that an IPO will have a large initial return (at least 20% or
25% one-day return) when participating NASD members, or their
associates or affiliates, own at least 10% of the issuer's common stock.
There is not a similar increased likelihood arising from the other two
types of conflicts of interest. Lastly, a somewhat more complex model
finds differences in the performance in the IPO-marketing phase
relative to the post-IPO pricing based on the kind of conflict of
interest.
In sum, this Article finds statistically significant differences in
IPO pricing depending on the type of circumstance that gives rise to a
conflict of interest." The results thus indicate that, to the extent these
NASD rules are designed to cause securities prices to be invariant to
the presence of a conflict of interest, they fail in their purpose.
Customary financial economics theory asserts that there is a
negative relationship between underpricing and the quality of the
issuer.2' It postulates that in an IPO in which the issuer is "certified"
by a third party, e.g., a reputable underwriter or venture capitalist, less
underpricing is required to sell the offering." A financial economist
might, therefore, argue that lower initial returns in IPOs involving
these conflicts of interest are not improper-that it is not the conflicts
of interest that cause lower returns on these IPOs. Rather, the financial
economist might argue it is the certification that allows market
participants to charge less.
An analogy illustrates the theory. Suppose a gem retailer sells
gems both on consignment and from its own inventory. Let us say
that, over time, one finds a higher price per gem for those from the
seller's own inventory. One might say that the retailer chose to buy the
19. Similar (or stronger) results are found in estimating the average effect of the
treatment (one of the three conflicts of interest), the "ATT," through propensity score
matching to control for possible endogeneity.
20. See infm Part VD.
21. See infr notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 79:859
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gem for resale, and, therefore, it "certified" its quality That is the
analog of the "financial economist" theory discussed above. On the
other hand, one might say that the gem retailer is more concerned
about getting a better price when it has an equity interest, and that
accounts for the price discrepancy.
There are a few problems with applying the above "financial
economist" theory to assess underpricing of IPOs involving conflicts
of interest. Krs4 investment banks, by paying millions of dollars, have
recently settled administrative proceedings alleging that they
recaptured some of this IPO initial return from investors by receiving
above-market compensation on other transactions. So, the
underpricing does not all go to the investors, and the IPO price is not
the product of a market assessment reflecting solely the value of the
IPO stock. Second, the results reported in this Article are inconsistent
with that theory. If "certification" accounts for underpricing, there
should be more "certification" and therefore less underpricing, from a
common stock investment than from a preferred stock or subordinated
debt investment. However, the results indicate there is more
underpricing for a common stock investment." In addition, it is
difficult to characterize an TPO used to pay off an investment bank as
representing "certification" of the issuer as of the time of the IPO.
Nevertheless, there is less underpricing in IPOs when the investment
banks (or their associates or affiliates) are being repaid with the
proceeds than in those where there is a common stock investment.25
These relationships are the opposite of what one would expect if
certification accounted for the impact on underpricing.
These results have a number of implications. This Article
provides evidence on the efficacy of a particular kind of gatekeeper.
The results are particularly pertinent to proposals, such as one in a
recent NASD call for comments, requiring that, in each IPO, the
reasonableness of the pricing be passed on by an independent broker-
dealer.6 The results presented in this Article suggest that type of
23. Seeinfa notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
24. See infa Tables 2, 4.
25. See hinia Part VD (interpreting the results of empirical testing of different
conflicts of interest).
26. NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NOTICE To MEMBERS 03-72, at 776 (Nov. 2003),
available at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/noticetomembers/
nasdw_003067.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2005). This proposal is only one of many concerning
the IPO process arising from recent scandals. E.g., NYSE/NASD IPO ADVISORY COMM.,
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF A COMMTITEE CONVENED BY THE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, INC. AND NASD AT THE REQUEST OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
2005]
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proposal will not be effective, because the independent investment
banks employed in [POs involving conflicts of interest are not
effective.27 These results also may be of use to those who wish to
extrapolate an assessment of gatekeepers' efficacy in one context to
another.
Lastly, the results raise concerns about the adequacy of the
regulation of securities offerings involving conflicts of interest.28
Prospectus disclosure of the facts underlying these conflicts of interest
historically has been cursory.29 The magnitude of the conflict of
interest frequently is not described clearly. Because these conflicts of
interest are associated with material changes in pricing and, one
supposes, the information can be gathered without significant burden,
more detailed disclosure of the identities of the persons with the
conflicts and the nature of the conflicts is warranted.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows: The IPO
process is described in Part II. After a brief introduction to theories
explaining IPO-pricing phenomena, Part I describes the mechanics of
IPO pricing, which inherently involve collusion among competitors,
and the NASD's regulation of IPO pricing in certain offerings raising
conflicts of interest. Part III provides context for the empirical
investigation by discussing prior theoretical and empirical work. As
noted in Part III, to the author's knowledge, no prior work has focused
on the range of conflicts of interest examined in this Article. The data
are described in Part IV, and the empirical results are presented in Part
V Part VI then sets forth a few proposals for revision of the current
regulatory structure, followed by a few concluding remarks.
II. THE IPO PROCESS
The process by which private companies raise funds in IPOs has
been the subject of recent scrutiny for a variety of reasons.30 The large
initial return associated with IPOs may potentially be an underlying
cause of various kinds of improper conduct. This Article investigates
the relationship between underpricing and a few forms of investment
bank conflicts of interest, in particular, receipt by investment banks
participating in the distribution (or their associates or affiliates) of
COMMISSION (May 2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/iporeport.pdf (last visited
Jan. 24, 2005).
27. See -fia Part VD.
28. See infra Part VD.
29. See infra notes 146-147 and accompanying text.
30. See infia notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
866 [Vol. 79:859
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more than 10% of the net proceeds and their ownership of 10% or
more of the issuer's common stock, preferred stock, or subordinated
debt.
A. Underpicig
Historically, stock sold in an IPO on average has traded
immediately following the IPO, e.g., by the close of business on the
first trading day, at a significant premium. Scholarly analyses have
placed the average initial return in the range of 15%.3" A wealth of
prior literature seeks to explain the reasons for this persistent
underpricing. This Article discusses some of that literature in Part III.
It is helpful, however, to preview the prominent explanations: the
underpricing, in part, compensates prospective investors for
undertaking the process of valuing the investment and for revealing
positive valuations and the underpricing resolves a "lemons"32 or
"winner's curse"33 problem-absent the underpricing, less-informed
investors would disproportionately receive allocations of overpriced
IPOs. A testable implication, and one that has been examined, " is that
IPOs underwritten by more reputable investment banks would have
less underpricing.
There are trends in the magnitude of the underpricing. At some
times, when the IPO market is "hot," the underpricing may
significantly exceed 15%. One such time was the recent Internet
bubble. Recent academic work reports the average underpricing in
1999 and 2000 was 50% or more, depending on the sample selected. 5
This short-term return represents substantial aggregate dollar
31. E.g., Roger G. Ibbotson et al., Initial Public Offerings, J. APPLIED CoRP. FIN.,
Summer 1988, at 37, 41 tbl. 1 (16.37% in 1960 through 1987).
32. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons'" Quality
Uncertainly and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 492-99 (1970) (illustrating the
"lemons" theory with an example involving a credit market having informed and uninformed
lenders, where the uninformed lenders will disproportionately lend to those with bad credit).
33. See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV.
597, 625 (1989) ("In an auction of an asset of uncertain value, bidders are vulnerable to the
'winner's curse': Even if they estimate value accurately on average, they win the bidding
primarily when they overestimate an asset's true value, and thus tend to overpay on average.").
34. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
35. Alexander Ljungqvist & William J. Wilhelm, Jr., !PO Pricing in the Dot-corn
Bubble, 58 J. FIN. 723, 729 tbl.II (2003) (reporting the mean initial return (underpricing) as
73.3% in 1999 and 57.7% in 2000).
2005] 867
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amounts36 and therefore provides underwriters substantial incentives to
try to capture some of the gain.
B. Inherent Collusion, LimitedAnoitrustApplicaion, and Mutple
Clients
In assessing the validity of applying normal economic models to
the IPO process, there are two ways that merit mention in which the
IPO market is fundamentally different from typical well-functioning
markets. One involves collusion and antitrust, and the second involves
a "bundling" that may not be obvious. This Part now explains those
two types of differences.
Antitrust. In a typical IPO, a syndicate (group) of investment
banks formally purchases securities from an issuer and immediately
resells them to the public." The investment banks' profits come from
the "spread," the difference between their purchase prices and the
prices at which they offer the securities to the market.8 The syndicate
members act as a unit in the following way: each member offers the
securities to the public at the same price. 9 The fee realized by each
underwriter is the subject of an agreement among all the investment
banks."° When securities are sold through syndicates, the process
inherently involves collusion among competitors (the investment
banks).
Recent litigation affirms the application of antitrust law to this
process is limited, on the basis that regulation by the SEC grants the
conduct implied antitrust immunity." This more limited review of
36. From 1980 to 2001, $488 billion (in 2001 dollars) was raised in IPOs. Jay R.
Ritter & Ivo Welch, A Review oflPOActiviy Pricing, andAllocations, 57 J. FIN. 1795, 1795
(2002).
37. 1 Loss & SELIGMAN, sUpra note 13, at 327-28.
38 Id. at 342-46.
39. Id. at 340.
40. Id at 333-40.
41. Friedman v. Salomon/Smith Barney, Inc., 313 F.3d 796, 797-98, 800-03 (2d Cir.
2002) (finding that implied antitrust immunity applies to an alleged conspiracy among
investment banks to inhibit flipping (quick resales) of securities by retail IPO investors
because price stabilization is regulated by the SEC); /n rv Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust
Litig., 287 F Supp. 2d 497, 499-500, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that implied antitrust
immunity applies to allegations that investment banks unlawfully conspired to inflate IPO
securities prices through underwriting syndicates by requiring, inter alia, "tie-in purchases" of
securities in the aftermarket), reconsideration denieg No. 01 Civ 2014 (WHP), 2004 WL
789770, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 13, 2004); see also Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S.
659, 685-86, 691 (1975) (finding an implied repeal of antitrust laws regarding the setting of
commission rates by stock exchanges, in light of SEC regulation). See generally 6 Loss &
SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 2824-27, 2836-55 (3d ed. rev. 2002) (discussing the application
of antitrust law); id. at 812 (Supp. 2005) (same).
[Vol. 79:859
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collusive behavior coupled with significant sums at issue '2 may affect
the extent to which other regulation of the IPO process will be
effective. There also may be collusion even when the antitrust laws
apply. One alleged illustration is a claim investment banks conspired
to fix underwriting compensation, in a part of the process not subject
to implied antitrust immunity.o4  In sum, because antitrust laws have
more limited application in this market, economic models that assume
the absence of collusion may not be applicable.
Bundling and Multiple Clients. The second anomaly in this
market involves NASD regulation of the pricing process and the fact
that investment banks have multiple clients. NASD rules partially
regulate who can realize the gain from abnormal initial returns in
IPOs. 4 The investment banks participating in an IPO are required to
make a bona fide offering of the securities at the public offering price."
They are not permitted to capture the higher value the market is
willing to pay for the securities by simply selling the securities to an
affiliate for resale at a higher price.46
However, settlements of recent administrative proceedings
indicate that investment banks in recent years have evaded these
restrictions. One way the banks did this was by having investors who
purchased securities in IPOs enter into other securities transactions at
above-market prices, rebating substantial portions of the initial return
to the investment banks.47 In addition, there are allegations that
42. See Ritter & Welch, supra note 36, at 1795 (noting that $488 billion in 2001
dollars was raised in IPOs from 1980 to 2001).
43. In re Issuer Plaintiff Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., No. 00 Civ. 7804, 2004
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3892, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004) (declining to grant defendants'
motion to dismiss, for failure to comply with the statute of limitations, claims alleging an
agreement fixing IPO underwriting spreads in violation of antitrust laws). In this same
matter, the court had previously held that this alleged conduct was not s,!bject to immunity
from antitrust laws. In re Issuer Plaintiff Initial Pub. Offering Antitrust Litig., No. 00 Civ.
7804, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10984, at *9-*12 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2003).
44. SeeNAT'L Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 11, Rule 2790 (Apr. 2004).
45. NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NoTICE TO MEMBERS 03-79, at 839-40 (Dec. 23,
2003) (announcing SEC's approval of new Rule 2790), available at http://www.nasd.com/
web/groups/rules.regs/documents/notice to-members/nasdw_003046.pdf (last visited Jan.
24, 2005).
46. See id. See generally 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 4071-88 (3d ed. rev.
2004) (discussing the NASD's regulation of fixed price offerings).
47. See CSFB Will Pay $100 Million, SEC Litig. Rel. No. 17,327 (Jan. 22, 2002)
(reporting the settlement, without admission or denial, of charges that Credit Suisse First
Boston allocated [PO shares to investors "willing to funnel between 33 and 65[%] of their
IPO profits to CSFB ... in the form of excessive brokerage commissions"), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl7327.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2005); Bear
Stearns, Deutsche Bank, Morgan Stanley Settle NASD IPO Charges, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 947 (2004) (reporting on the settlement by three major investment banks, without
2005]
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investment banks allocated IPO securities to the personal accounts of
individuals in a position to direct future securities business to those
banks.48 Because these rebates were paid, a theoretical economic
model that views these IPO transactions in isolation is built on an
uncertain assumption.
Even without these rebates, it may be improper to use a
theoretical economic model that is focused solely on IPO prices. An
investment bank underwriting an IPO may consider both the issuer and
the IPO investors to be the bank's clients. The investment bank
therefore necessarily has conflicting interests. If the investment bank
facilitates profitable transactions for investor-customers, the
investment bank may get other future business at market prices (as
their admission or denial, of NASD charges involving allegations that very high commissions
were paid to the banks in exchange for allocations of IPO shares); see also EBC I, Inc. v.
Goldman Sachs & Co., 777 N.YS.2d 440, 442-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (reversing the
dismissal of claims alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment and affirming the
dismissal of a claim alleging breach of fiduciary duty against the lead manager in litigation
where the complaint alleged that the underwriter "underpriced plaintiff's shares in order to
reap an additional profit, beyond the amount realized on the spread between the price of its
own subscription and the higher public offering price, when it 'flipped' its shares in the
balloon-priced aftermarket, and that such underpricing was also the consideration given for
'kickbacks' from defendant's favored customers, to whom defendant had allocated shares in
the IPO that were also flipped in the aftermarket, disguised as commissions on unrelated
transactions"); 9 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 13, at 4078-88 (3d ed. rev. 2004) (discussing
Papilsky v. Berndt, No. 71 Civ. 2534, 1976 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14442 (S.D.N.Y June 24, 1976)
("[T]he federal district court held ... that a mutual fund, its directors, and its investment
adviser/underwriter could be held liable for failure to recapture underwriting sellers'
discounts for the benefit of the fund")).
48. See, e.g., SEC v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, No. 03 Civ. 2946 (WHP), at 3
(S.D.N.Y Oct. 31, 2003) (enjoining defendant investment bank from "giving preferential
allocations of shares in initial public offerings to directors, officers, or executives of existing
or potential investment banking clients"), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/judgl8l 10.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2005); L re eBay, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A.
No. 19988-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 4, at *3-*7 (Feb. 11, 2004) (denying defendants'
motion to dismiss in an action alleging that the investment bank allocated IPO shares to
directors and officers of its customer in hopes of obtaining future business); Press Release,
Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Fines Piper Jaffray $2A Million for IPO Spinning (July
12, 2004) (announcing $2.4 million settlement of allegations, which Piper Jaffray neither
admitted nor denied, that Piper Jaffray allocated shares of hot IPOs to executives of
companies from whom they were soliciting investment business, resulting in $2.4 million of
personal profit for these executives), athttp://www.nasd.com (last visited Jan. 24, 2005). The
NASD has proposed new rules to regulate this practice. NAT'L Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS,
NOTICE TO MEMBERS 02-55, at 523-31 (Aug. 2002) (proposing a ban on spinning), available
at http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/noticeto_members/nasdw_
003492.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2005); NASD Proposes New Rules to Regulate Ibital Public
Offerings, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 2030 (2003) (indicating the SEC had not ruled on
the adoption of the rules as of December 2003). For a general discussion of spinning, see
Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO-Breach ofFiduciay Duty or Business as Usual
43 WM. & MARY L. Rv. 2023, 2029-56 (2002).
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distinguished from the naked kickbacks described in the previous
paragraph). Therefore, a simple theoretical economic model that looks
only at the IPO-pricing phenomena, without taking into account the
other incentives, e.g., returns to investment banks in other transactions,
can be misleading.
C The NASD Qualified independent UnderwnterRules
Because investment banks have both issuers and investors as
clients, they necessarily have conflicts of interest. The conflicts of
interest are more acute in some IPOs, however. An investment bank
participating in an IPO, or one of its affiliates, may have an equity
stake or subordinated debt investment in the firm. These investments
may, for example, be through venture capital funds managed by
affiliates." Additionally, an underwriter or its affiliate may be
receiving a portion of the proceeds of the offering, frequently where an
issuer uses IPO proceeds to repay a loan from a commercial bank
affiliated with an underwriter.
50
NASD rules seek to protect the investing public from sales of
overpriced IPO securities when participating investment banks have
conflicts of interest by requiring the stock be sold at a price no higher
than "that recommended by a qualified independent underwriter."5 In
the late 1990s (throughout the time period of the data set studied in this
Article), the conflicts of interest that triggered the requirement for a
QRU included, inter alia, (1) more than 10% of the net offering
proceeds, excluding underwriting compensation, was to be paid to
members participating in the distribution (or their associated persons
or affiliates), subject to certain exceptions;52 (2) a member participating
in the distribution (or certain related persons) sold securities in the
offering or in the following ninety days, unless those securities were
not more than 1% of the securities being offered;53 and (3) 10% or
more of the issuer's common stock or preferred stock or subordinated
debt was owned by a member participating in the distribution (or its
associated persons or affiliates). 4  For this purpose, members
49. Eg., MFRS.' SERVS. LTD., PROSPECTUS, 11,000,000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK
63-64 (June 22, 2000), available athttp://www.sec.gov (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
50. E.g., VIASYSTEMS GROUP, INC., PROSPECTUS, 44,000,000 SHARES OF COMMON
STOCK 99 (Mar. 23, 2000), available athttp://www.sec.gov (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
51. NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 11, Rule 2720(c)(3)(A) (Dec. 2003).
52. NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, REPRINT OF THE MANUAL Rule 271 0(c)(8) (July
2001).
53. Id. Rule 2710(c)(7)(C) (repealed Mar. 22, 2004).
54. Id. Rule 2720(b)(7); id. Rule 2720(c)(1).
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participating in the distribution include, in addition to underwriters,
other NASD members in the selling group.5 Lower court authority
indicates that when an investment bank elects to act as a QIU, it
assumes the potential liability of an underwriter under section 11 of
the Securities Act of 1933.56
The NASD rules are revised reasonably frequently. For example,
the QIU requirement in the second-listed circumstance was recently
amended. That requirement was eliminated." Instead, the rules now
generally prevent the sale in an IPO, or within 180 days thereafter, of
securities acquired by underwriters in the 180 days before the filing of
the registration statement.58
D. Setting the 1PO Price
A company begins the IPO process by selecting an investment
bank to manage the offering (called the "lead manager" or the
"managing underwriter"). 9  In many cases, before selecting a
managing underwriter, the issuer speaks with a number of prospective
investment banks, in a process sometimes called a "beauty pageant."'
During the beauty pageant, banks disclose price estimates (estimates
55. Id. Rule 2720(c)(1) (referencing "underwrit[ing], participat[ing] as a member of
the underwriting syndicate or selling group, or otherwise assist[ing] in the distribution").
56. Harden v. Raffensperger, Hughes & Co., 65 F3d 1392, 1403-04 (7th Cir. 1995)
(acting as a QIU imposes underwriter liability under section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933;
15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000); and, for purposes of the limit in section 1 (e), a QIU is considered to
have underwritten the entire issue). There is additional authority construing the legal
consequences of a QIU relationship. E.g., Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F3d 617,
624-25, 630 (1st Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal for failure to state a claim as to, inter alia,
claim prospectus disclosure, concerning the recommendation of a QIU, was false or
misleading); Feiner v. SS & C Techs., 11 F Supp. 2d 204, 210 (D. Conn. 1998) (denying a
motion to dismiss claims against a QIU alleging that the QIU's due diligence was inadequate
and that the prospectus inaccurately described the factors the QIU considered in
recommending a price); In re Walnut Equip. Leasing Co., No. 97-19699DWS, 1999 WL
1271762, at *6, *9-* 11 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 1999) (finding a QIU's indemnification
claim for attorneys' fees in defending itself to be subordinated under 11 U.S.C. § 510(b)
(2000)).
57. See NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 04-13, at 123, 149 (Feb.
2004) (identifying the pertinent amendment to Rule 2710), available at
http://www.nasd.com/web/groups/rules-regs/documents/noticeo-t -members/nasdw_003258.
pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2005).
58. NAT'LASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supranote 11, Rule 2710(g)(1) (Nov. 2004).
59. Abby M. Alderman & Kenneth Y Hao, The Inhial Public Offering Process, in
How TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 1995, at 405, 413 (1995) (PLI Corp. L. &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 904, 1995).
60. E.g., Avital Louria Hahn, Investment Banks Continue to Hunt for Telecom
Research, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG., Jan. 10, 2000, at 10 (using the term "beauty pageant").
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of the pricing they anticipate they will be able to realize).' Those price
estimates and other factors are considered by the issuer in choosing an
investment bank to manage its IPO.
62
The actual IPO price is not set at the beauty pageant. It will not
be set until the day before the offering commences, 3 normally a few
months later.' Preparation of preliminary disclosure documents (the
preliminary prospectus), due diligence, and marketing using the
preliminary prospectus intervene.65
Between the selection of an investment bank to manage an IPO
and the IPO pricing, the balance of relative negotiating power shifts in
favor of the investment banks. The issuer cannot change investment
banks at the last minute.66 As the planned IPO date comes close, the
options available to the issuer if the IPO is postponed-what it will do
if it does not promptly receive the proceeds it has planned to receive-
become increasingly limited. For example, Malone describes IPO
pricing in the following way:
61. SeeAlderman & Hao, supa note 59, at 411-15.
62. Id.
63. See CARL W SCHNEIDER ET AL., GOING PUBLIC: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND
CONSEQUENCES 7-8 (2002).
64. See id. at 7.
65. Alderman & Hao, supia note 59, at 416-18 (identifying drafting and marketing
phases); John R. Hoynes, Sample Time and Responsibility Scheduling for an Ir'tial Public
Offenng, in How TO PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, supra note 59, at 43, 47
(identifying due diligence timing).
66. Consider, for example, two parts of the activities of a managing underwriter that
occur before pricing: the "road show" and due diligence. As part of marketing an IPO, the
investment bank managing the offering typically orchestrates "road show" presentations,
marketing events at which presentations are made to prospective investors. CHARLES J.
JOHNSON, JR. & JOSEPH MCLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS 150
(2d ed. 1997). Among other matters, the underwriters' employees may present projections of
future issuer performance. Id at 134. Before the IPO, the underwriters also perform due
diligence. The precise contours of the due diligence investigation depend on the context. In
general terms, however, it involves, inter alia, a review of documents; a review of information
underlying the issuer's financial statements; discussions with the issuer's employees;
inspections of the issuer's facilities; and depending on the circumstances, the issuer's major
lenders, suppliers, and customers. See, e.g., William E Alderman, Due Diligence in the Post-
Enron Em: Practical Tips from Litigatois on Mitigating Underwnter Risk, in HOW TO
PREPARE AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING 2004, at 461, 473-76 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. 1450, 2004). Due diligence forms a basis for defense to potential
liability under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2000).
It also is a basis for rebutting allegations of scienter, an element of a claim under Rule 1 Ob-5,
17 C.FR. § 240.1Ob-5 (2004). Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
Substitution of a new managing underwriter requires the new manager be comfortable with
the extent of the due diligence and the accuracy of information previously disseminated at the
road shows.
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The company executives, in turn, often come away from the pricing
session embittered. Until this moment the underwriter may have
seemed to be their greatest advocate, but now, when it is too late to turn
back, the underwriter turns on them; indifferent to the company's needs,
the underwriter now takes care of its own image, low-balling the price
to guarantee the maximum number of shares sold to look good in the
61proposal to the next sucker.
Other popular press reports confirm the view that there is a last-minute
change in negotiating strength and approach to negotiation.68
When the pricing meeting arrives, the managing underwriter will
have a sense of what price it believes the stock will trade at
immediately following the IPO. Preliminary indications of interest
received in the marketing process will provide a basis for that
assessment. One can view the pricing decision as one in which the
difference between the preliminary estimate revealed in the beauty
pageant and the actual value (the market price immediately following
the IPO) is split between the issuer and the investors. If the IP0 price
is higher, the issuer receives more, and, because of less underpricing,
the initial IP0 investors receive less. The way the underwriters bargain
to split this price change between the issuer and the investors may be
affected by any conflicts of interest the underwriters have. For
example, the investment banks may wish to "leave a good taste in
investors' mouths" if the investment banks retain equity and
contemplate selling stock at a future time, a theory some of the
financial economics literature supports.6 9
It is important to note that reputational factors will not necessarily
eliminate last-minute renegotiation. Market forces are less likely to
67. MICHAEL S. MALONE, GOING PUBLIC: MIPS COMPUTER AND THE ENTRE-
PRENEURIAL DREAM 197-98 (1991).
68. A chief financial officer was quoted as describing pricing in the following way:
"I feel like I've been to a proctologist-and he had a very cold finger." Robert D. Hof, Inside
an InternetIPO, Bus. WK., Sept. 6, 1999, at 60, 70; see also Carol Hall & Cynthia Robbins-
Roth, Going Public Without Panic, RECORDER, May 6, 1992, at 8 ("Pricing is a factor that
caught many senior managers by surprise. By the time the pricing meeting occurs,
companies typically are not negotiating from a position of strength."); Robert A. Mamis, The
Making of a Millionaire, INC., May 1995, at 86, 95 (describing the underwriters as stating a
price in a particular IPO with a message, "take it or leave it").
69. See Ivo Welch, Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of
Initial Public Offerings, 44 J. FIN. 421, 422-23 (1989) ("formalizing" the argument that
"issuers may want to 'leave a good taste in investors' mouths' so that future underwritings
from the same issuer could be sold at attractive prices"). But see Roni Michaely & Wayne H.
Shaw, The Prcing of Initial Public Offeings: Tests of Adverse-Selection and Signaling
Theories, 7 REv. FIN. STUD. 279, 311 (1994) (criticizing the Welch model's conclusions and
finding that "firms that underprice more tend to go to the reissue market less often and for
lesser amounts").
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restrain this kind of activity because, as noted above," applicable
antitrust principles, which otherwise foster competition, are watered-
down in their application to investment banks. In addition, prospective
issuers cannot easily find accurate information about how individual
investment banks have acted in the past. The pricing negotiations are
not required to be made public.71
I. ExISTNG THEORETICAL MODELS OF THE IPO PROCESS
The customary underpricing of IPOs has been the subject of
substantial scholarship. A comprehensive discussion of the theories
would be an article in itself (and one that has recently been done72).
The IPO-pricing process is complex and difficult to model
comprehensively in a precise way. This Article does not seek to
address the basic question of whether IPO pricing in offerings
involving conflicts of interest is "correct" in the sense of reflecting a
return to investors consistent with the returns available otherwise in the
market. It also does not purport to provide a comprehensive analysis
of all IPO-pricing phenomena. Part of the problem in trying to
develop a comprehensive model is that it is clear that there has, at least
in recent years, been manipulation of the pricing process. Investment
bank settlements, resulting in payment of millions of dollars, evidence
this fact.
3
Nevertheless, before turning to the empirical modeling and
results, it is helpful to summarize some of the vast literature on IPOs.
There are two pertinent strands of the financial economics literature
that converge. One strand is focused on the IPO process.4 A second
pertinent strand75 examines the Glass-Steagall Act,76 separating
commercial banking from investment banking, and the repeal of
70. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text.
71. See NAT'L Ass'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 26, at 776 (soliciting comments on
the possibility of requiring disclosure of "how the managing underwriter and the issuer
arrived at the... final IPO price").
72. Ritter & Welch, supra note 36, at 1795. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist have written
another source collecting theories. See generallyTIM JENKINSON & ALEXANDER LJuNGQVIST,
GOING PUBLIC: THE THEORY AND EVIDENCE ON How COMPANIES RAISE EQUITY FINANCE (2d
ed. 2001).
73. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 80-100 and accompanying text.
75. See infla notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
76. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
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sections 20" and 32" of the Glass-Steagall Act by the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act. 9
A. 1PO Underpricing Generdly
As noted above, there has historically been an initial return from
buying in an IPO on the order of 15%."0 Fifteen percent of all IPO
proceeds represents a large aggregate dollar amount.' Although
numerous theories seek to explain the phenomenon, a few prominent
theories merit mention.
One theory discussed above is that the underpricing is designed
to dispose investors to buy in future offerings." Although Michaely
and Shaw believe this underpricing does not help IPO issuers in their
subsequent offerings,83 it might benefit the underwriters in future
transactions.
A more elegant theory, involving a "lemons" problem or a
"winner's curse" theory, can be illustrated by assuming (1) there are
two types of IPOs, those that are overpriced and those that are not, and
(2) there are two types of investors, informed and uninformed." If
IPOs are typically oversubscribed, then uninformed investors will
disproportionately receive allocations of overpriced IPOs, resulting in
a below-average return." In support of this theory are some older
empirical investigations finding a negative relationship between
underpricing and both the quality of the investment bank managing the
PO8 and the presence of venture capital investors. However,
77. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994) (repealed 1999) (prohibiting member banks of the Federal
Reserve from affiliating with organizations engaged principally in certain listed securities
activities).
78. Id. § 78 (repealed 1999) (prohibiting, subject to certain exceptions, employees,
officers, and directors of Federal Reserve banks from acting in such a capacity with a firm
primarily engaged in certain securities activities).
79. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
80. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
81. See discussion supra note 36.
82. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
83. See Michaely & Shaw, supra note 69, at 311.
84. This theory is typically traced to Kevin Rock, WhyNewIssuesAre Underpriced
15 J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1986).
85. See Michaely & Shaw, supra note 69, at 315.
86. E.g., Richard B. Carter et al., Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the
Long-Run Performance ofIPO Stocks, 53 J. FIN. 285, 285, 292-94 (1998); Richard Carter &
Steven Manaster, Init/al Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1061
tbl. Ifl, 1062 (1990); Michaely & Shaw, supra note 69, at 295, 296 tbl. 5,299.
87. William L. Megginson & Kathleen A. Weiss, Venture Capitalist Certification in
Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 879, 879-80 (1991).
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investigations of more recent years find a positive relationship between
underpricing and underwriter quality, which is more difficult to
harmonize with this theory."
A recent working paper, by Li and Masulis, examines the
relationship between beneficial ownership by underwriters (and their
affiliates) and underpricing in the period 1993 through 2000.89 They
find the percentage ownership of underwriters (and their affiliates),
especially lead underwriters, although not the mere existence of
ownership by underwriters (and their affiliates), to be associated with
less underpricingY On the basis of the evidence they present, they
assert, "[T]he evidence supports underwriters' venture investments in
IPO issuers serving as a credible certification mechanism and a means
to better align underwriter interests with issuers, rather than creating a
serious conflict of interest problem for IPO investors."9'
One problem with this interpretation is Gompers and Lerner
seem to reach a different result in an earlier period." Gompers and
Lerner argue the apparent increased underpricing they find is a
consequence of perceived conflicts of interest that cause investors to
demand lower prices."3
A second concern is that Li and Masulis report results based on
percentage ownership of the issuer. However, they find, in results they
do not report (meaning the actual regression results are not disclosed),
that, upon "substitut[ing] underwriter dollar ownership in place of
underwriter percentage ownership... that our primary conclusions are
qualitatively unchanged, though the significance of the results
noticeably weakens."' 4  Because the results are not reported
88. Randolph P. Beatty & Ivo Welch, Issuer Expenses and Legal Liability in Initial
Public Offerings, 39 J.L. & ECON. 545, 588 (1996); Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, supra note 35, at
749.
89. Xi Li & Ronald W Masulis, Venture Capital Investments by IPO Underwriters:
Certification, Alignment of Interest, or Moral Hazard, 1, 9 (Dec. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.ssm.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2005). Ljungqvist and Wilhelm also find a negative
relationship between the amount of stock owned by investment bank affiliates before the IPO
and underpricing, and they reference, but do not fully report, results looking at the
participation of those investment banks in the offering. Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, supra note 35,
at 731, 737 tbl.V, 746.
90. Li & Masulis, supm note 89, at 12, 18-19 n.20.
91. Id at 29.
92. Paul Gompers & Josh Lemer, Contlict of Interest in the Issuance of Public
Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital, 42 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10, 20 (1999) ("While
significance levels are low, there does appear to be a monotonic relationship between venture
capital/underwriter affiliation and underpricing. A closer relationship is associated with
greater underpricing.").
93. Id.
94. Li & Masulis, supra note 89, at 19 (emphasis added).
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quantitatively, it is difficult to comment on them in detail. However,
were certification the cause of a change in underpricing, one would
think that the dollar amount of an investment would be at least as
important a factor as the percentage investment in the issuer. The
greater importance of the percentage ownership would be more
consistent with the importance of investment bank control of the
issuer.
Third, there also is a fundamental problem with the data available
to researchers that complicates interpretation of the Li and Masulis
results. The definition of percentage ownership does not directly
reflect the purposes for which Li and Masulis use it. They take
percentage ownership from prospectuses. "5 The SEC rule that requires
disclosure of percentage ownership in prospectuses incorporates the
ownership definition from a rule designed to provide notice of the
potential for a change in control."6 The definition is based on control
of voting power or investment power; it is not based on financial
interest." Thus, interests owned by venture capital funds will be
attributed to the manager of the fund, even if the manager's financial
return is not directly affected by the return to the fund. Moreover, one
is considered the beneficial owner of securities as to which one merely
shares voting or investment power. The percentage ownership may,
therefore, represent some factor other than implicit certification by the
investment bank. One would need to know more about what causes
venture capital firms to take large positions in companies to assess
their results.
This fact raises questions about various aspects of the theoretical
formulations they discuss. For example, as part of formulating a
"certification hypothesis," they assert, "Equity investment in issuers
also places underwriter capital at risk." '9 An investment bank affiliate
may have no capital at risk in an issuer but nevertheless have a
disclosed beneficial stock ownership interest. That is not to say there
could not be "certification." There could, for example, be a more
attenuated "certification'" as the investment bank affiliate's reputation
for selecting investments for others could suffer. However, the
95. Li & Masulis, supm note 89, at 9.
96. See 17 C.ER. § 228.403 (2004); id. § 229.403 (mandating disclosure of any
beneficial owner of more than 5% of a class of voting securities); id § 240.13d-3 (defining
beneficial ownership).
97. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
98. See 17 C.ER. § 240.13d-3.
99. Li & Masulis, supra note 89, at 4-5.
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evidence simply does not report on the more direct kind of
"certification."
Fourth, the theory seems too brilliant to be true.' °° It suggests a
tautological analysis. If the conflict of interest is associated with less
underpricing, i.e., relatively worse pricing for the investor, it is not that
the conflict of interest has caused the relatively higher IPO price.
Rather, investors have not demanded as high an initial return, because
of some sort of certification. It would provide a rationale that would
account for worse IPO pricing even if the conflicts of interest are a
problem, causing higher pricing (less underpricing).
As to the efficacy of QIUs, Li and Masulis find, also in results
they do not quantitatively report, that when they add a variable
indicating the presence of a QIU in their regressions, the variable is not
statistically significant."' They conclude, on the basis of the
insignificance of the variable, that "[t]his evidence suggests that the
QIU mechanism is ineffective in protecting PO investors.""'°
They do not explain the rationale for that conclusion, and it does
not appear to follow. Of course, the fact that a relationship is not
statistically significant does not mean there is not an actual
relationship."3  More significantly, even if there were not a
relationship, that could also be consistent with QRUs functioning
perfectly. Let us put aside, for the moment, any results for the
percentage ownership by affiliates of participating underwriters. If a
variable simply identifying the presence of a QIU required by equity or
subordinated debt ownership were not statistically significant, that
could arise were QIUs to work perfectly, entirely negating the impact
any conflict. Because (1) the percentages used by Li and Masulis do
not necessarily correspond to investment bank affiliate financial
interest in issuers, and (2) their results are "noticeably weaken[ed]," to
100. Cf Daniel A. Farber, The Case Against Bnilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917, 917
(1986) ("I will argue, however, that 'brilliance' should count heavily against an economic or
legal theory. The same traits of novelty, surprise, and unconventionality that are considered
marks of distinction in other fields should be considered suspect in economics and law, in
which thoughtfulness may be a more important virtue. I will further suggest that the current
academic bias in favor of brilliant, 'paradigm shifting' work should be abandoned in favor of
the more pedestrian activity of 'normal science."' (footnotes omitted)).
101. Li & Masulis, supra note 89, at 19.
102. Id
103. See DAMODAR N. GUJARATI, BASIC ECONOMETRICS 129 (3d ed. 1995) ("If on the
basis of a test of significance... we decide to 'accept' the null hypothesis, all we are saying is
that on the basis of the sample evidence we have no reason to reject it; we are not saying that
the null hypothesis is true beyond any doubt .... Better still ... 'the conclusion of a statistical
test is "do not reject" rather than "accept* .... (emphasis added) (quoting JAN KMENTA,
ELEMENTS OF ECONOMETRICS 114 (1971)).
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a level they don't identify,, when looking at the dollar amount at issue,
the way they have formulated their investigation does not seem to
enlighten adequately the question of the efficacy of QIUs. Separately
investigating the relationship between pricing and various different
circumstances that can require a QIU, as this Article does, illuminates
differences that are otherwise masked.
Lastly, there is some ambiguity in their article concerning the
kind of circumstance requiring a QIU that they examine. A footnote to
their piece indicates a QIU is required for ownership of subordinated
debt or equity, but the note does not identify receipt of a percentage of
proceeds (or the other, less common, reasons).'" It is not clear, then,
whether they tested the presence of a QI-U or the presence of a QIU
where required by ownership of equity or subordinated debt.
B. Universal Banks
Investigations of "universal" banks, or commercial banks
affiliated with investment banks, are pertinent to this investigation,
because commercial banking relationships can give rise to debt
obligations that are repaid in IPOs underwritten by affiliates. The
pertinent existing financial economics literature does not present a
coherent picture. There is some evidence that debt used to refinance
existing debt requires higher yields,' °5 suggesting that using the
proceeds in this way creates conflicts of interest requiring greater
investor compensation." There is also evidence that a bank loan to a
low-rated issuer decreases the rates the borrowers have to pay in other
loans not used to refinance existing debt.
10 7
A few articles examine IPO underpricing and the existence of a
lender that can, itself or through affiliates, underwrite stock. Schenone
finds a negative, generally statistically significant relationship between
underpricing and the issuer having a lender with an affiliate that can
104. Li & Masulis, supmnote 89, at 19 n.21.
105. Amar Gande et al., Bank Underwriting ofDebt Securities.- Modern Evidence, 10
REv. FIN. STUD. 1175, 1188-90, 1190 tbl. 5 (1997).
106. But cf Luca Benzoni & Carola Schenone, Conflict of Interest or Certification?
Evidence from IPOs Underwritten by the Frm Relationship Bank 21 (Sept. 2004)
("Relationship banks avoid potential conflicts of interest by choosing to underwrite their best
clients' IPOs. Rational investors anticipate the bank's reaction and value issues underwritten
by the pre-IPO lender higher than IPOs managed by independent banks."), available at
http://ssrn.com.
107. Gande et al., supra note 105, at 1190-91; Manju Puri, Commercial Banks in
Investment Banlng: Conflict of Interest or Certification Role 40 J. FIN. ECoN. 373, 383 tbl.
3 (1996) (illustrating the negative relationship between yield and the presence of a
commercial bank as lead or sole underwriter prior to the Glass-Steagall Act).
880 [Vol. 79:859
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underwrite stock,' °8 although she finds no significant additional impact
on underpricing when that investment bank is used in the offering."'
However, she does not specifically examine IPOs in which the
proceeds are used to repay such a lender. In addition, Klein and
Zoeller find that, in Germany, there is a positive relationship between
the use of a universal bank and initial return." °
C Existing Literature Incomplete in Examining Conflicts of Interest
and QIUs
The existing literature is not focused on separately assessing
pricing in offerings involving the different contexts that can require the
use of a QIU."' This Article, to the best of the author's knowledge, is
the first (1) to examine directly the efficacy of QIUs in restraining the
impact of conflicts of interest arising from receipt of more than 10% of
PO proceeds, (2) to examine separately conflicts of interest arising
from ownership of at least 10% of preferred stock or subordinated
debt, and (3) to compare each of these kinds of conflicts
simultaneously.
There is an important advantage to examining simultaneously
each of these kinds of conflicts, over and above being the first
examination of two of these kinds of conflicts of interest. The different
kinds of conflicts of interest have different levels of "certification." A
108. Carola Schenone, The Effect of Banking Relationships on the Finn IPO
Underpncing, 59 J. FiN. 2903, 2923-24 tbl. VI, 2944 tbl. XI (2004). Related work has been
done by Rajesh Narayanan, Kasturi P Rangan, and Nanda K. Rangan, who examined pricing
of seasoned (non-IPO) equity offerings in 1994 through 1997. They found that "lending bank
comanaged issues are priced no different than investment bank-underwritten issues. Lending
bank lead managed issues on the other hand are priced lower [i.e., have more underpricing]
than investment bank underwritten issues." Rajesh P. Narayanan, Kasturi P. Rangan & Nanda
K. Rangan, The Role of Syndicate Structure in Bank Underwting, 72 J. FIN. ECON. 555, 557,
560 (2004).
109. Schenone, supranote 108, at 2923, 2943.
110. Peter G. Klein & Kathrin Zoeller, Universal Banking and Conflicts of Interest:
Evidence from German Initial Public Offerings 4 (Contracting & Orgs. Research Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2003-06, Sept. 24, 2003), available athttp://ssm.com (last visited Jan. 25,
2005).
111. Works touching on this in some way include Gompers & Lemer, supra note 92, at
21 tbl. 7 (finding results similar to the results reported in this Article for the existence of a
conflict of interest arising from common stock ownership); Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, supra
note 35, at 730-31, 746 (reporting beneficial ownership by investment bank affiliates,
including those not participating in the distribution, and describing as "not reported" an
insignificant coefficient interacting this variable with participation in the IPO, without
identifying the sign of the estimate); Chris J. Muscarella & Michael R. Vetsuypens, A Simple
Test of Baron Model of JPO Underpricing, 24 J. FN. ECoN. 125, 125 (1989) (examining a
sample of banks that participated in their own IPOs); and Li & Masulis, supra note 89
(discussed supm notes 89-104 and accompanying text).
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common stock investment has more risk than a subordinated debt
investment and therefore should be associated with more
"certification" if certification accounts for any pricing differences. By
comparing the relative impact of the different conflicts of interest that
have different levels of certification, we can assess whether
certification accounts for any pricing differences. To preview the
results, the investigation shows pricing differences that are difficult to
attribute to certification.
IV DATA
For purposes of this investigation, all common stock IPOs
consummated during the four years ended December 31, 2000, were
located in the Securities Data Company (SDC) database of securities
offerings. This period was chosen because the SEC fully implemented
electronic filing of prospectuses by U.S. issuers during 1996."2 Some
of the information used in the regressions was hand collected from the
SEC filings. Starting in 1997 avoids having a sample censored in a
way that may affect the results.
Offerings of financial companies, identified as firms having four-
digit primary Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes beginning
with "6" (6xxx), were excluded.'13 That filter removes certain unusual
offerings, e.g., offerings of financing entities and IPOs concurrent with
the demutualization of insurance companies. The pertinent statistics of
the offerings used below were taken from the SDC database, with the
following exceptions. For each offering, the prospectus was manually
reviewed to identify (1) offerings involving simultaneous offerings of
warrants and (2) some other anomaly in the offering (e.g., although the
offering is classified as an IPO, the prospectus reveals the stock was
trading over-the-counter before the offering). Offerings involving
either were eliminated from the data set. A review of the prospectuses
also was used to locate (1) the shares outstanding after the offering and
(2) whether the issuer had two or more classes of stock outstanding
after the offering. The first closing price for the security as well as
prices for the NASDAQ composite index at pertinent times were taken
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database.
Those IPOs whose securities could not be located in CRSP were
112. 17 C.FR. §232.901(a)(1) (1996) (superseded) (outlining the transition to
electronic filing); Changes and Corrections to EDGAR Phase-in List, Securities Act Release
No. 7258, 61 Fed. Reg. 2270,2270-71 (Jan. 25, 1996).
113. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH mADMin., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, SIC MANUAL,
available athttp://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic-manual.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
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eliminated. A few corrections to the SDC data, posted on Professor
Jay Ritter's Web site,"4 were manually made. Using these filters, a
sample of 1188 IPOs was created, consisting of all IPOs in that four-
year period that might be classified as "traditional" IPOs for which
SDC's database and CRSP report the information used in the models
presented below.
The prospectuses filed with the SEC were searched for reference
to a qualified independent underwriter or the NASD rules requiring
the use of a QIU. That review identified fifty-five IPOs where a QIU
was required because more than 10% of the net proceeds was being
paid to NASD members participating in the distribution of the IPO (or
their associates or affiliates).' Sixty IPOs were found where 10% or
more of the issuer's common stock was held by participating NASD
members (or associates or affiliates), and eighteen IPOs where 10% or
more of the issuer's preferred stock or subordinated debt was so held.
Summary statistics for all 1188 IPOs and the three subsets of
IPOs involving these conflicts of interest are presented in Table 1.
These summary statistics suggest differences in initial return among
the groups. The mean underpricing in the whole sample is 47%,
compared to the underpricing in the subsamples involving conflicts of
interest arising from receipt of proceeds (20%), common stock (52%)
and preferred stock or subordinated debt (15%). The 20% and 15%
means are statistically significant, at the 1% levels, when compared to
the complementary subsamples of IPOs not involving the respective
conflicts."'  IPOs involving those conflicts are larger and less
frequently involve venture backing compared to the full sample.
114. Professor Ritter's Web site is available at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm
(last visited June 21, 2004).
115. The circumstances giving rise to a conflict of interest are fact-intensive, in a way
that may not be adequately captured by a single dummy variable, and they may involve
assorted other conflicts of interest. For example, the prospectus for the $100 million, June 7,
2000, IPO of Ubiquitel, Inc., involves an underwriter having a conflict of interest by virtue of
ownership of the issuer's preferred stock and subordinated debt. The prospectus discloses
that an affiliate of the lead underwriter previously agreed to purchase $100 million of
additional shares of preferred stock if the IPO did not close before July 31, 2000. UBIQUITEL
INC., PROSPECTUS, 12,500,000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK 129 (June 7, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov (last visited Jan. 25, 2005). The conflict of interest arising from that
relationship seems likely to provide a strong incentive for the investment bank to close the
IPO.
116. In two-sample ttests with unequal variances, the t-statistics testing equality of the
means are 5.276 (p-value of 0.00); -0.467 (p-value of 0.64); and 4.453 (p-value of 0.00).
8832005]
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Table 1
Summary statistics of 1188 IPOs of nonfinancial firms from 1997 through
2000 and for the subsets of IPOs involving a QIU because of the receipt of more than
10% of the net proceeds, the beneficial ownership of 10% or more of the issuer's
common stock, or the beneficial ownership of 10% or more of the issuer's preferred
stock or subordinated debt.
All IPOs QIU for Receipt of% of Proceeds
(1,188 lPOs) (55 IPOs-
mean med. min max st. dev. mean med. min max st. dev.
niial return(%) 46.78 18.7 -43.27 697.5( 77.44 19.7 8.33 -10,6, 202.74 35.94
Pre-IPO adjust (%) 8.63 5.8 -58.33 344. 33.17 -0.72 0.0( -50b( 71.43 18.79
offer size (millions) 85 5- 5 5,47( 218 161 101 924 18:
est. offer size (millions) 77 5 4,26- 177 154 10( 70 154
venture backed 0.55 1 0.3A
mderwriter reputation 7.71 8.1 1. 9.10 1.89 8.60 9.10 3.10 91 1.0
retain(%) 71.5A 75.15 0.f 94.65 16.72 65.7. 70.3 0.0( 90.0 19.1
high tech 0.71 0.34
bubble period 0.51 0.5'
dual class 0.0A 0.2(
assets pre-IPO-millions 143 2 - 21,828 959 3& 158 17 1,89
days in registration 98.19 77 2 1,010 71.97 103.0( 76 34 84 111.79
QIU-% proceeds 0.0 1.00(
QIU-% common 0.051 0.10
QlU--% sub debt or 0.01 0.091
referred I
affiliate is lead 0.041 0.40 -
QIU for Ownership of Common QIU for Ownership of Preferred
or Sub. Debt
(6OPOs) (18 IPOs)
mean med. min max st. dev. mean med. min max st. dev.
nitial return (%) 51.92 25.2 -19.64 507.5( 88.15 15.3' 2.7 -8.65 105.5 28.83
xre-IPOadjust(%) 9.36 7.1 -39.13 191.67 32.51 -11.7' -2.5( -50.0( 20.00 23.0O
)ffer size (millions) 115 79 14 76' 138 12, 6 7 924 207
est. offer size (millions) 102 6( 1 693 121 12: 7E 70( 153
venture backed 0.41 0.51
nderwriterreputation 8.4 9.1( 4.10 9.1C 1.24 8.29 9.1 3.1 9.1 1.6
"etain(%) 69.46 74.0 0. 88.13 17.57 72.51 75.1 51.36 85.00 9.15
ih tech 0.62 0.61 -
)ubble period 0.52 .0.50
Il class 0.07 0.22
issetspre-lPO-millions 42 6 3 10,798 1,451 180 & 7 1,213 314
lays in registration 111.73 76.5 15 1,01 139.94 88.3q 72.5 33 261 56.91
IU--% proceeds 0. 1Ad 0.274
IU-% common 1. 0.111
QIU--% sub debt or 0.03 1.00
)referred
kffiliate is lead 0.41 7 0.1 1 1
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Loughran and Ritter provide rankings of investment bank
quality,"7 a ranking that is commonly used in the IPO literature."8 On
this scale, the highest rank is 9.1. ' For each offering, the rank of the
underwriter "running the books" (the managing underwriter or the lead
manager) was identified, using the Loughran and Ritter rankings. On
rare occasions, more than one underwriter may be so identified. In
those cases, the average rank was assigned.
The mean underwriter prestige similarly is higher in offerings in
the subsamples involving QIUs, ranging from 8.3 to 8.7, compared to
7.8 for the sample as a whole.
The mean of a variable reflecting expected post-IPO retention by
pre-IPO shareholders, retain, is similar in magnitude between the
samples: ranging from 66% to 73%. This variable is designed to
reflect the percentage of the issuer the parties, at the time the TPO was
filed, expected the pre-IPO shareholders to own following the offering.
The shares outstanding after the offering were taken from the
prospectuses. The shares expected to be outstanding were computed
by subtracting the shares actually offered and adding the shares
initially registered. Because the estimated size of an offering can
change over time, these two numbers are not necessarily the same.
The variable retain is a ratio, expressed as a decimal, whose numerator
equals the number of shares expected to be outstanding after the
offering minus the number of shares expected to be offered, and whose
denominator is the number of shares expected to be outstanding after
the offering.
V EMPIRICAL MODELS AND RESULTS
A. Jnidal Model ofulai'alReturn
For purposes of providing evidence bearing on the efficacy of
QIUs as gatekeepers, this Article examines the relationship between
the initial return, the presence of a conflict of interest, and various
control variables. The initial return used is the percentage change
117. Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, Carter-Manaster Reputation Rankings for IPO
Underwriters 1980-2000, at http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.pdf (last visited Mar. 24, 2004)
[hereinafter Loughran & Ritter, Reputation Rankings] (providing data used in Tim Loughran
& Jay Ritter, Why Has IPO Underprcing Changed over Thne., FIN. MGMT., Autumn 2004, at
5 [hereinafter Loughran & Ritter, Changed over Time] (updating rankings provided in Carter
& Manaster, supra note 86, at 1063 app. II)) (on file with author).
118. See Li & Masulis, supm note 89, at 10, 34, 38 tbl. 4; cf Carter et al,, supra note
86, at 285-86 (finding more explanatory power with their measure compared to others).
119. Loughran & Ritter, Reputation Rankings, supa note 117, at 1.
2005]
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(expressed as a decimal) from the IPO price to the first closing price
reported by CRSP.
To create a model, it is not proper simply to grab all possible data,
throw it into a statistical package, and look at the results. Rather,
formulation of this kind of model calls for development of principles
or theories justifying the inclusion of the various variables included on
the right hand side of the equation (the independent variables).
The large existing financial economics literature examining IPOs
provides a starting point for this purpose. Use of a size variable is
common in the literature.' ° The size used is the estimated offer size at
the time the IPO is initially filed, as opposed to the actual offer size.
As identified by Hansen, use of the actual size raises econometric
concerns, because the size adjusts in proportion to price, a component
of the variable on the left hand side of the equals sign-the dependent
variable.' Use of the estimated size eliminates that concern.
Controlling for the reputation of the investment bank is
common. '22 Loughran and Ritter's ranking is included. Because the
relationship may be nonlinear, this ranking squared is also included.
Megginson and Weiss find, in a sample of IPOs from 1983
through 1987, the presence of venture capital backing provides
certification of an issuer that is associated with a decreased IPO initial
return. They argue this certification results in issuers not needing to
compensate prospective investors as much for making an investment,
thereby producing a negative relationship between venture capital
backing and initial return.' The presence or absence of venture
capital backing used in the models presented below was taken from the
SDC database.
The percentage of the offering retained by pre-IPO shareholders
may reflect private information concerning the quality of the firm.'25
Retention of a greater share of the firm therefore may be associated
with an absence of undisclosed, negative information about the firm at
120. See, e.g., Carter & Manaster, supa note 86, at 1057 (using the offering size as a
control variable); Megginson & Weiss, supra note 87, at 896 (controlling for size in order to
measure the influence of venture capital backing).
121. Robert S. Hansen, Do Investment Banks Compete in iPOs?" The Advent of the
"7% Plus Contract'" 59 J. FiN. EcON. 313, 339 (2001).
122. E.g., Megginson & Weiss, supra note 87, at 897-98 (using market share of lead
underwriters in order to gauge quality).
123. Id
124. Id at 879.
125. See Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmeties Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 372 (1977) ("[Tlhe entrepreneur's
willingness to invest in his own project can serve as a signal of project quality.").
[Vol. 79:859
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the time of the beauty pageant. For this reason, the variable retain is
included. A dummy variable dual class controls for variation in retain
arising when the existence of a second class of common stock would
cause the variable retain to overstate percentage ownership.
The natural logarithm of the issuer's total assets before the
offering, expressed in millions of dollars, is also included as an
independent variable. There are no a priori expectations concerning
how that variable will be directly related to IPO stock performance.
Rather, a relationship with the likelihood there will be a QIJ is
hypothesized. The financing needs of larger firms before an IPO may
be greater. Firms with more pre-IPO assets may therefore be more
likely to obtain financing from affiliates of investment banks that, for
example, are ultimately repaid in an [PO.
To account for technology stocks being "hot" during the period,126
a dummy variable reflecting the participation of a high technology
issuer is included. This variable is taken from the SDC database, and
equals one where SDC classifies the issuer in one or more high
technology areas.
The percentage change, expressed as a decimal, in the NASDAQ
Composite Index from the last close before the date of the IPO to the
following close, and that change over the time the offer was in
registration, are also used to control for changes in the market as a
whole. The models also include a dummy variable reflecting offerings
in 1999 and 2000 (the bubble period).
The regression also includes the number of days the offering is in
registration, i.e., the time between the first filing with the SEC
reported by SDC and the date of the IPO. This variable is not
commonly used in the financial economics literature, yet there are
good reasons to believe this variable is important. If the SEC asks
difficult questions during their review, it may take longer to satisfy the
SEC that the disclosure is accurate. This variable, therefore, may be a
proxy for problems the issuer's offering presents.
Lastly, dummy variables reflecting each of the three types of
conflict are included, as well as a fourth indicating whether an NASD
member with a conflict is acting as lead manager in the offering.127
A number of approaches are taken to modeling the relationship
between IPO underpricing and underwriter conflicts of interest.
126. See Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, supra note 35, at 723 (providing certain comparative
statistics for the "dot-corn bubble").
127. The prospectuses sometimes do not identify the investment bank with a conflict
of interest. In some cases, the information could not be discovered from other SEC filings.
20051 887
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Model 1, in Table 2, presents the results of the first approach-an
ordinary least squares estimation of the following model:
initial return (percentage expressed as a decimal) = P3+ 03, In(est. size) +
03, underwriter reputation + 33 underwriter reputation + (3, NASDAQ 1-
Day return (percentage expressed as a decimal) + (35 NASDAQ return
from the filing of the registration statement to the IPO date (percentage
expressed as a decimal) + (36 venture backed + P3, retain + (38 dual class +
(39 high tech + 310 bubble period (1999-2000) + 1,, In (total assets
before IPO, in millions) + 1,2 days in registration + 13 QIU for percent
proceeds + 1, QIU for common stock + P , QIU for preferred stock or
subordinated debt + (16 affiliate is lead + c
Model 2 in Table 2 is identical, except it omits the underwriter
reputation squared variable, because use of two underwriter reputation
variables is not common in the literature. Comparison of the results of
Models 1 and 2 shows using the underwriter reputation squared
variable slightly increases the fit of the model (the R-squared increases
by one percentage point) and the results are not qualitatively changed
by the use of this variable.
A second approach involves using logit model of the likelihood
that there will be a large initial return. Because there is some
judgment in deciding what is a "large" initial return, Table 3 presents
results of three different logit models. They use the same independent
variables used in Model 1. They vary in terms of what is considered a
"large" initial return: 20%, 25%, or 30%.
Table 4 presents pairwise comparisons of the coefficients for
(1) a conflict of interest arising from common stock, (2) a conflict
arising from noncommon-stock ownership, and (3) receipt of a portion
of the proceeds. There is a common theme in each of these results:
the initial return for IPOs involving a common-stock conflict of
interest is greater than that for the other conflicts of interest. IPO
pricing varies depending on the type of conflict of interest.
888 [Vol. 79:859
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Table 2
Ordinary least squares estimation of the relationship between one-day initial
return (percent divided by 100) and the following conflicts of interest requiring the
use of a QIU: receipt by participating NASD members (or their associates or
affiliates) of more than 10% of the net proceeds, ownership by participating NASD
members (or their associates or affiliates) of 10% or more of the issuer's common
stock, and ownership by participating NASD members (or their associates or
affiliates) of 10% or more of the issuer's preferred stock or subordinated debt.
Sample comprises 1188 IPOs of nonfinancial firms from 1997-2000. In brackets
below estimated coefficients are t-statistics computed using Huber-White robust




In(est. size) -0.126 -0.129
[3.431]*** [3.506]***




NASDAQ 1-Day Return (decimal) 2.368 2.428
[2.007]** [2.059]**
NASDAQ pre-IPO return (decimal) 0.840 0.820
[5.352]*** [5.287]***




dual class 0.175 0.205
[2.2301** [2.652**
high tech 0.065 0.070
[1.4911 [1.605]
bubble period 0.319 0.332
[8.787]*** [9.098]***
In (total assets before IPO (millions)) 0.003 0.009
[0.165] [0.465]
days in registration -0.002 -0.002
[7.348]*** [7.248]***
QIU for % proceeds -0.146 -0.124
[2.351]** [2.017]**
QIU for common 0.150 0.163
[1.255] [1.367]
QIU for preferred or sub. debt -0.269 -0.258
[2.977]*** [2.851]***
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Table 3
Logit estimation of the relationship that the likelihood an IPO will involve at
least a 20%, 25%, or 30% one-day initial return and the following conflicts of interest
requiring the use of a QTU: receipt by participating NASD members (or their
associates or affiliates) of more than 10% of the net proceeds, ownership by
participating NASD members (or their associates or affiliates) of more than 10% of
the issuer's common stock, and ownership by participating NASD members (or their
associates or affiliates) of 10% or more of the issuer's preferred stock or subordinated
debt. Sample comprises 1188 IPOs of nonfinancial firms from 1997-2000. Below
QIU variable names are numbers of IPOs with returns of at least 20%, 25%, and 30%.
Below estimated coefficients, in brackets, are t-statistics computed using Huber-
White robust standard errors. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are shown
by ***, **, and *, respectively.
at least 20% at least 25% at least 30%
(3) (4) (5)
In (est. size) -0.508 -0.548 -0.508
[3.051]*** [3.036]*** [2.732]***
underwriter reputation 0.219 0.657 0.397
[0.932] [2.343]** [1.381]
underwriter reputation2  0.013 -0.021 -0.002
[0.713] [1.010] [0.086]
NASDAQ I-Day Return (decimal) 3.931 4.397 1.899
[1.017] [1.142] [0.499]
NASDAQ pre-IPO return (decimal) 2.555 2.519 2.706
[5223]*** [5.169]*** [5.503]***
venture backed 0.346 0.288 0.307
[2.264]** [1.804]* [1.860]*
retain 1.081 2.276 2.567
[1.750]* [3.148]*** [3.291]***
dual class 0.454 0.786 0.729
[1.348] [2.194]** [2.044]**
high tech 0.536 0.458 0.553
[2.876]*** [2.266]** [2.576]**
bubble period 0.962 1.265 1.323
[5.858]*** [7.381]*** [7.469]***
In (total assets before IPO (millions)) -0.033 -0.091 -0.096
[0.440] [1.163] [1.1531
days in registration -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
[4.696]*** [4.221]*** [4.082]***
QIU for % proceeds -0.425 -0.777 -0.380
(N = 18/11/11) [1.101] [1.857]* [0.870]
QIU for common 0.827 0.957 0.603
(N = 36/32/30) [2.216]** [2.494]** [1.565]
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at least 20% at least 25% at least 30%
QIU for preferred or sub. debt -0.719 -0.706 -0.754
(N = 6/5/4) [1.235] [1.141] [1.060]
affiliate is lead 0.089 0.010 -0.083
[0.208] [0.022] [0.182]
constant 4.872 3.312 2.779
[1.787]* [1.132] [0.924]
Pseudo R 0.185 0.219 0.226
Table 4
Pairwise comparisons of equality of selected regression coefficients in Models
1, 3,4, and 5. Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels are shown by ***, **, and
*, respectively.




QIU for % proceeds = QIU for common 0.020**
QLU for common = QIU for preferred or sub. debt 0.003**
QLU for % proceeds = QIU for preferred or sub. debt 0.273
Model 3:
Dependent Variable-Likelihood at Least 20% Initial Return
QLU for % proceeds = Q[U for common 0.009***
QLU for common = QLU for preferred or sub. debt 0.012**
QLU for % proceeds = QIU for preferred or sub. debt 0.655
Model 4:
Dependent Variable-Likelihood at Least 25% Initial Return
QIU for % proceeds = QLU for common 0.001***QIU for commnon = QIU for preferred or sub. debt 0.011 **
QIU for % proceeds = QIU for preferred or sub. debt 0.916
Model 5:
Dependent Variable-Likelihood at Least 30% Initial Return
Q1U for % proceeds = Q1U for common 0.063*
QIU for commnon = QIU for preferred or sub. debt 0.056*
Q21U for % proceeds = QfU for preferred or sub. debt 0.620
Comparing IPOs with these conflicts of interest to those without
conflicts produces a somewhat complex picture. Examining Model 1,
there is a negative relationship between initial return and both (1) a
conflict from ownership of preferred stock and subordinated debt
(-26.9%; p-value of 0.003) and (2) a conflict from receipt of a
percentage of the proceeds (-14.6%; p-value of 0.019). The parameter
estimates are also economically significant. On the other hand, there is
a positive relationship between a conflict arising from common stock
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ownership and the likelihood of an initial return of at least 20% (p-
value of 0.027) and an initial return of at least 25% (p-value of 0.013).
The results for the other independent variables are generally
consistent between the models and consistent with the literature. The
high technology dummy variable is positive and, in predicting large
initial returns (Models 3 through 5), significant, as is that for IPOs in
the Internet "bubble period" (1999 and 2000). Underpricing is an
increasing function of underwriter reputation measure. As in
Loughran and Ritter, there is a positive relationship between venture
capital backing and initial return'28 (although Ljungqvist and Wilhelm
find the opposite relationship'29). The estimated coefficient for the
variable retain is somewhat unexpected-it is positive. However, the
results would be consistent with Loughran and Ritter's assertion that
"during the internet bubble issuers placed less weight on IPO proceeds
and more weight on the proceeds from future insider sales and follow-
on offerings than they did in prior periods.""'
The coefficient for the days in registration is negative and
significant, as expected. In unreported regressions, the results for the
conflict of interest variables are qualitatively similar with this variable
omitted. The results thus are not a spurious artifact of using this
variable.
B. Propensity Score Matching and Estimation ofLikelihood ofa
Conflict
Although the ordinary least squares model presented in Model 1
is a good step in modeling the relationship between initial return and
the presence of a conflict of interest, there is a potential concern that
may suggest it is desirable to confirm the results by an alternative
technique. The problem is that we would like to be able to examine
pairs of IPOs that are identical but for the presence of a conflict of
interest. We cannot do that, of course. For each actual IP0, either
there is a conflict of interest or there is not. The problem is that
various variables considered in the models also may affect whether
there is a conflict of interest. This relationship creates what is called
"endogeneity" which may affect the validity of the ordinary least
squares regressions."'
128. Loughran & Ritter, Changed over Time, supra note 117, at 45 tbl. 5.
129. Ljungqvist & Wilhelm, supra note 35, at 743 tbI.VI.
130. Loughran & Ritter, Changed over Time, supra note 117, at 26.
131. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND
PANEL DATA 50-51 (2001).
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One procedure for addressing this concern involves "propensity
scores," meaning the likelihood that a particular offering will involve a
conflict of interest.'32 The procedure involves modeling the probability
that a particular observation, in this case, an IPO, will involve the
participation of an underwriter having a conflict of interest. The term
"treatment" is used to identify the characteristic of interest. In this
case, that characteristic is the presence of a conflict of interest.
Observations involving the treatment are matched, in various ways,
with observations of similar propensity scores in which the treatment
is not present."'
A program written for Stata software implements this matching
and estimates the average effect of the treatment on the treated (called
ATT) and the standard error of that estimate.' The ATT was
estimated by kernel matching, which involves matching each
observation involving the treatment (each of the conflicts of interest)
"with a weighted average of all controls ... inversely proportional to
the distance between the propensity scores of treated and controls.""'
The untreated matched observations are limited to the area of
"common support."'" To find the area of common support, the
observations involving a conflict with the highest and lowest estimated
propensity for having a conflict are identified. Observations not
involving a conflict with propensity scores outside that range are
omitted from the matching.'37
The propensity scores for the presence of each of the treatments
(conflicts of interest) were generated using logit models.' The
independent variables in the estimations are the same as those used in
Model 1 (other than the three dummy variables reflecting the presence
of a conflict of interest and whether a lead manager had a conflict).
There are three models, each having one of the three types of a conflict
of interest as a dependent variable.
132. For a discussion of propensity scores, see, for example, id. at 620-21; Paul R.
Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational
Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIoMETRiKA 41, 41-55 (1983).
133. See Rosenbaum & Rubin, supra note 132, at 48.
134. Sascha 0. Becker & Andrea Ichino, Estination of Average Treatment Effects
Based on Propensity Scores, 2 STATAJ. 358, 361-76 (2002) (discussing the program).
135. Id.at361.
136. See id. at 362 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the common
support "option" which the program allows for).
137. See id. at 360, 362, 371 (discussing both how the area of common support is
determined and how using it may improve the quality of matches).
138. SeeinfiaTable3.
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This methodology involves stratifying the observations based on
propensity score and confirming that, within each stratum, the means
of the independent variables are balanced.'39 The Stata program
confirms whether the balancing property is satisfied, using a significance
level of 0.01.4' The balancing property is satisfied for the sample of
1188 IPOs and the models used.'"
These results, reported in Table 5, confirm the conclusions drawn
from the ordinary least squares regressions. The estimated ATT for a
conflict of interest arising from receipt of proceeds is -0.245 (24.5%),
and the estimated ATT for a conflict of interest arising from ownership
of subordinated debt or preferred stock is -0.329 (32.9%). Both are
statistically significant at the 1% level. The ATT for a conflict of
interest arising from ownership of common stock is positive and not
statistically significant.
Table 5
Estimation of ATT on one-day initial return through propensity score matching,
using kernel matching. Treatments consist of (1) QIU for receipt by participating
NASD members (or their associates or affiliates) of more than 10% of the net
proceeds, (2) QIU for ownership by participating NASD members (or their associates
or affiliates) of 10% or more of the issuer's common stock, and (3) QIU for ownership
by participating NASD members (or their associates or affiliates) of 10% or more of
the issuer's preferred stock or subordinated debt. Independent variables include, for
each estimation: ln(est. size), underwriter reputation, underwriter reputation2,
NASDAQ .-Day Return (decimal), NASDAQ pre-IPO return (decimal), venture
backed, retain, dual class, high tech, bubble period, In (total assets before IPO
(millions)), and days in registration. Following AlTs are t-statistics, computed using
bootstrapped standard errors (200 repetitions). Estimations limited to areas of
common support. Propensity scores estimated with logit models. Significance at the
1% level shown by ***.
No. of Obs. No. of Controls ATr t-statistic
QIU for % proceeds 55 755 -0.245 -3.739***
QIU for % common 60 1075 0.087 0.812
QfIU for preferred or sub. debt 18 1129 -0.329 -3.942***
139. See Becker & Ichino, supra note 134, at 359-60 (describing the process and
theory).
140. Id at 366.
141. The balancing property is also satisfied in the corresponding subsamples
restricted to the areas of common support, except in the estimation of the ATT for a QIU
required for receipt of a percentage of proceeds. In that case, one variable, In (total assets
before IPO (millions)), is unbalanced. Where the propensity score for a QIJ required for
receipt of a percentage of proceeds is estimated with a probit model, the balancing property is
satisfied in the subsample restricted to the area of common support. That model produces
similar results (observations: 55; controls: 616; ATT: -0.228; t-statistic: -3.599). Estimating
that ATT, not restricted to the area of common support and using a logit model to estimate
propensity scores, also produces similar results.
894 [Vol. 79:859
HeinOnline  -- 79 Tul. L. Rev. 894 2004-2005
NASD REGULA TION
C Pre-lPO and Post-IPO Quartiles and Centiles
The last way of examining any difference in IPO pricing that
arises from the existence of a conflict of interest is novel. The
principle to be investigated is the following: at the time an IPO is
priced, the underwriters will have an idea of the demand for the IPO at
various prices and, therefore, some sense of what the price of the IPO
stock can be expected to be at the end of trading on the day of the IPO.
IPO pricing in part involves splitting the difference from the price that
was initially estimated at the beauty pageant to that estimated closing
price between the issuer and the investors.
The statistics in Table 1 show that the pre-IPO price adjustment,
with a mean of 8.6 percentage points in the full sample and a standard
deviation of 33, is more modest than the initial return, with a mean of
47 percentage points and a standard deviation of 77. We can compare
where a particular LPO is, in the sample, in terms of its pre-IPO price
adjustment, relative to where the IPO is, in the sample, in terms of its
initial return. For example, an IPO might be in the first (lowest)
quartile in terms of pre-IPO price adjustment and in the third quartile
in terms of initial return. We can compare the differences in these
quartiles for each IPO. If the IPO-pricing process is invariant to the
conflicts of interest, we would expect to find no significant
relationship between the presence of a conflict and the quartile change.
The results of two models of this kind of relationship are
presented in Table 6. They use the same independent variables used in
Model 1 (except the bubble period variable is omitted). To show that
the results are robust, models comparing quartiles and centiles (divided
into hundreds) are reported, showing the underpricing quartile or
centile minus the quartile or centile of the pre-EPO price adjustment.
To control for differences among years, the quartiles and centiles are
computed for each calendar year, based on the year of issuance, and
the bubble period variable is omitted.
20051
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Table 6
Ordinary least squares estimation of relationship of: quartile or centile of the
one-day initial return for the IPO among IPOs sold in the calendar year minus quartile
or centile of the pre-IPO price adjustment for the IPO among IPOs sold in the
calendar year. Independent variables include, inter alia, receipt by participating
NASD members (or their associates or affiliates) of more than 10% of the net
proceeds, ownership by participating NASD members (or their associates or
affiliates) of 10% or more of the issuer's common stock, and ownership by
participating NASD members (or their associates or affiliates) of 10% or more of the
issuer's preferred stock or subordinated debt. Sample comprises 1188 IPOs of
nonfinancial firms from 1997-2000. In brackets below estimated coefficients are t-
statistics computed using Huber-White robust standard errors. Significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels are shown by ***, **, and *, respectively.
_ __rtles Centiles
In(est. ize) -0.140 -4.307
(2.410]** [2.871]***
underwriter reputation 0.248 5.140
[2.701]*** [2.144]**
underwriter reputation' -0.017 -0.353
[2.283]** [1.871]*
NASDAQ I-Day Return (decimal) 1.191 47.690
[0.803] [1.324]
NASDAQ pre-IPO remturn (decimal) -0.827 -21.591
[4.361]*** [4.621]***




dual class 0.104 2.501
[0.758] [0.720]
high tech 0.032 1.767
[0.430] [0.932]
In (total assets before IPO (millions)) -0.024 -0.181
_ay [0.802] [0.232]
ys in registration 0.001 0.014
[1.285] [0.8441
QIU for % proceeds 0.042 1.596
[0.309] [0.4671
QIU for common 0.279 6.181
[2.193]** [2.084]**
HIU for preferred or sub. debt 0.180 5.051
[0.755] [0.736]





The results show a positive relationship between these quartile
and centile differences and the presence of a common stock conflict of
896
Initial Return Stratum minus
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interest, but no statistically significant relationship for the other types
of conflicts of interest. This result is subject to a number of
interpretations. It is consistent with investment banks more
aggressively influencing the initial aftermarket pricing when their
affiliates own the issuer's common stock. It is not at all clear, however,
than any post-IPO influence could be extended until subsequent sales
were made. One might formulate alternative rationales as well.
Although it is difficult to select among competing interpretations of
the differences, the fundamental inquiry involves whether pricing
mechanisms in offerings involving QIUs function differently. These
results provide further support for the conclusion that there is such a
difference.
D. Interpretation ofResults
In sum, the results show these conflicts of interest produce
different kinds of IPO pricing. There is less underpricing in IPOs
involving conflicts of interest for preferred stock or subordinated debt
and for conflicts arising from receipt of a portion of the proceeds. It is
not surprising that the presence of a QIU will not cause the IPO-
pricing process to be invariant to the presence of these conflicts of
interest. The investment banks typically charge only a modest sum, or
nothing, to act as a QIU. For example, Credit Suisse First Boston
charged $10,000 to act as QIU in the $137 million October 2000 IPO
of Westport Resources Corporation, a modest amount relative to the
$9.3 million aggregate underwriting fee for the IPO.' 2 Expecting a
QIU to mitigate conflicts of interest for such a small fee may be too
optimistic.
This Article does not purport to provide a comprehensive
economic rationale why IPO pricing has the pattern the results reveal.
One hypothesis might be that somehow the investment banks' retained
equity in [PO firms is ultimately enhanced by greater underpricing,
e.g., by attracting greater interest in subsequent offerings.'43 Yet
malfeasance in IPO marketing makes it difficult to model the process
fully. In any case, that puzzle is principally a question of financial
economics, not a legal one. The question this Article seeks to answer
is whether the regulatory environment succeeds in making IPO pricing
142. See WESTPORT RES. CORP., PROSPECTUS, 9,150,000 SHARES OF COMMON STOCK,
1, 73 (Oct. 19,2000), availableathttp://www.sec.gov (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
143. See supm note 130 and accompanying text.
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invariant to the conflicts of interest. The results make clear the answer
is "No."
It is important to note, in considering the results, that the IPO
market was hot within the time period studied. IPO underpricing in
the late 1990s was extreme. How firms are affected by conflicts of
interest depends on the magnitude of the amount at issue. If only
immaterial amounts are at issue, a conflict of interest may have no
impact on performance. Because, as noted above, pricing relationships
in IPOs have changed over time-more reputable investment banks
being associated with relatively more underpricing in recent times,
with the opposite relationship earlier-it is not clear that the
relationship found in this Article could be expected to apply to, or be
identifiable in, other periods involving qualitatively different IPO
markets.'" However, in assessing the consequences of conflicts of
interest, one must contemplate the atypical markets as well as the
typical ones. An analogy illustrates the point: if one wishes to assess
the performance of security guards, one needs to examine how they act
when there is trouble, even if trouble does not ordinarily occur.
Lastly, there are multiple factors that influence the incentives of
investment banks. They have client relationships with both issuers and
investors, who each have divergent interests in IPO pricing. An
investment bank's conflicts are therefore multifaceted. The importance
and impact of investment bank conflicts of interest may change with
the ebb and flow of the relative importance of investment bank
relationships with various constituencies.
VI. POSSIBLE REFORM
The results in this Article can be useful for setting expectations
about the efficacy of imposing explicit gatekeeping obligations on
investment banks. For example, the NASD recently solicited
comments on a proposal to require that, in each IPO, the
reasonableness of the pricing be passed on by an independent broker-
dealer. "5 Because the results in this Article indicate QIUs are not
effective in eliminating pricing differences, there is reason to be
skeptical about the efficacy of that possible revision.
The principal purpose of this Article is to provide evidence of the
impact of the efficacy of the NASD's current rules designed to restrain
144 See generally supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing reversals of
other relationships over time).
145. NAT'LASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supranote 26, at 776.
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the impact of various kinds of conflicts of interest. It provides
evidence useful in assessing the efficacy of express gatekeeping
obligations. Although preparation of a comprehensive set of
regulatory reforms designed to address the problems in the regulatory
environment highlighted by recent corporate scandals would be much
too voluminous to try to detail here, there are some focused
improvements that this investigation clearly highlights.
The first proposal concerns the information about the "receipt of
proceeds" conflict of interest that needs to be disclosed. The results in
this Article indicate these relationships are associated with pricing
differences. However, the currently required disclosure of the
relationships is not sufficient to analyze them. NASD Rule 2710(h)(1)
requires the disclosure of (1) the fact that the offering is subject to the
rule, (2) the name of QrU, and (3) that the QIU is assuming
responsibilities in pricing and due diligence. ' This information is not
adequate to assess the extent of the conflict of interest. If the conflicts
of interest are important, which the above empirical analysis indicates
they are, an investor would want to know the magnitude of the conflict
of interest. Information useful in assessing conflicts includes (1) the
actual amount of proceeds being directed to participating NASD
members and (2) the identities of the NASD members.
The former is useful, because, for example, one would expect the
consequences of an 85% allocation of the proceeds to underwriters to
be different from that of a 15% allocation of the proceeds. The fact
that an institutional investor may be able to ask about the matter in a
road show presentation is not a satisfactory substitute. A more detailed
assessment of the efficacy of QIUs requires looking at broad trends,
and that assessment is impeded when the information is not made
publicly available.
The latter is also useful, because it may be that the conflict of
interest has a different impact depending on the role the investment
bank has in the particular offering. Making that assessment is difficult
when the identities of the parties with conflicts are not prominently
disclosed.
A second proposal concerns the prominence of the information.
The empirical analysis indicates a relationship of a substantial
estimated magnitude. The presence of a conflict of interest merits
more prominent disclosure than a customary description buried in the
146. NAT'L ASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supm note 11, Rule 2710(h)(l) (Nov. 2004).
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"Plan of Distribution" section of a prospectus.1 7 Requiring disclosure
either on the front or back cover or in some other prominent location
would be appropriate.
A third proposal involves the complementary issue of conflicts of
interest arising from equity or subordinated debt ownership. As noted
above, the criterion for ownership currently employed is based on
control, as opposed to financial interest."8 Ownership can be, for
example, either through an affiliate-managed venture capital fund or
through another entity that is a wholly owned subsidiary of a common
corporate parent. The impact of a conflict of interest arising from
equity or subordinated debt ownership may vary between these two
types of ownership structures. Without more detailed disclosure of the
relationships, it is difficult to know.
VII.. CONCLUSION
The NASD's rules provide that when certain kinds of investment
bank conflicts of interest are present, an issuer is required to sell the
securities at a price no higher than that recommended by a QIU.'49
These offerings involve explicit certification, as compared to the
implicit certification normally arising from an investment bank's
participation in a securities offering. A review of IPOs of nonfinancial
firms from 1997 through 2000 indicates there are significant
differences between price statistics of IPOs presenting conflicts of
interest requiring QIUs, depending on the kind of conflict of interest
involved.
The results cannot be attributed to certification-the traditional
financial economics story. There is relatively more underpricing in
IPOs in which a conflict arises from ownership of common stock than
in IPOs in which participating NASD members receive a portion of the
proceeds or beneficially own preferred stock or subordinated debt. If
certification accounted for pricing differences, there should be
relatively less underpricing. Insofar as these NASD rules are
considered as seeking to employ investment banks as "gatekeepers" to
147. Cf 17 CER. § 230.421(a) (2004) ("The information required in a prospectus...
shall not ... be set forth in such fashion as to obscure any of the required information or any
information necessary to keep the required information from being incomplete or
misleading."); Royce de R. Barondes, Adequacy of Disclosure of Restrictions on Flipping
IPO Securities, 74 TUL. L. REv. 883, 909 (2000) (discussing "buried" disclosure).
148. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
149. NAT'LASS'N OF SEC. DEALERS, supra note 11, Rule 2720(c)(3)(A).
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make IPO pricing invariant to the existence of these conflicts of
interest, they do not succeed.
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